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ABSTRACT 
111 
I describe the theoretical and empirical contributions that rigorous economic analysis can 
make in improving our understanding of the causes of and the solutions to a variety of international 
environmental problems. I do this by analyzing and summarizing the intellectual contributions of 
fourteen papers about the design and the implementation of international environmental agreements 
(lEAs). 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE 
ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 1 
1. Preliminaries 
The doctrine of utilitarianism tells us that the rational pursuit of self-interest by individual 
economic agents is likely to lead to the greatest good for the greatest number. Although this line of 
reasoning has exerted a powerful influence on a number of prominent Western thinkers, as Oran 
Young (1989, p. 1) has pointed out, it is important to recognize that this line of reasoning runs 
"counter to some of the most powerful findings produced by social scientists working 
in .. .international relations." Indeed, in the world of international environmental affairs, it is now 
well known that the pursuit of self-interest, in the absence of efficacious institutions and rules is 
more likely than not "to produce collective outcomes that are socially undesirable ... " (Young, 1989, 
p.2). 
Given this state of affairs, the general purpose of this book is to study a class of problems that 
typically arise in the world of international environmental affairs. In particular, the chapters in this 
book seek to document the theoretical and empirical contributions that rigorous economic analysis 
can make in improving our understanding of the causes of and the solutions to a variety of 
international environmental problems? 
II thank Qing Xu for competent research assistance, and Theo Panayotou and Tom Tietenberg for comments 
on a previous version of this paper. I acknowledge fmancial support from the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, 
Utah State University, Logan, UT 84322-4810, by way of project UTA 024. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2International environmental problems have attracted the attention of researchers in a number of fields other 
than economics. In paIiicular, there is now a sizeable literature in political science on such problems. However, in this 
book, we shall be concerned almost exclusively with the economics of international environmental problems. For more 
on the relevant political science literature, the reader should consult Krasner (1983 ), Young (1989), Epstein and Gupta 
(1990), Benedick (1991 ), Peterson (1992) , Rosenau and Czempiel (1992), Haas et al. (1993), Wettestad (1994), 
Bernauer (1995), and Victor et al. (1998) . 
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There are at least three distinguishing features of international environmental problems. First, 
these problems have the property that the detrimental environmental effect on each affected country 
depends in large part on the global discharge of some hazardous material or materials. Examples of 
such problelTIs include the effects of chloroflourocarbon (CFC) emissions on the earth's ozone layer 
and the effects of carbon dioxide (C02) and other greenhouse gas emissions on the world's climate. 
Second, as the perspicacious work ofDemsetz (1967) has made clear, one way to deal with 
global environmental problems is to require effective intervention by an apposite regulatory 
institution. Indeed, if one could design and empower an international institution to intervene for the 
good of all, then international environmental problems would be easy to redress. However, as 
Krasner (1983), Keohane et al. (1993), and Batabyal (1996, 1997, 1999) have noted, national 
sovereignty considerations have in general proved to be an effective stumbling block in the design 
of international institutions with teeth. 
This leads to the third distinguishing feature of international environmental problems, i.e., 
the necessity of agreements in solving these vexing problems. As Keohane et aI., 1993, p. 4, 
emphasis added) have put it, "organized international responses to shared environmental problems 
will occur through cooperation among states, not through the imposition of government over them." 
This is also the position taken in this book. Recognizing the salience of international environmental 
agreements (lEAs) in solving global common property problems, the chapters in this book explore, 
from an economic standpoint, many of the issues that are germane in increasing our knowledge of 
the ways in which lEAs work, and the ways in which they can be made to work even better. 
What can economic theory tell us about the design of lEAs that will protect the world's 
fragile environmental resources? This is the general question that is addressed by the eight 
chronologically arranged chapters that comprise Part II of this book. The tools of microeconomic 
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and game theory are used effectively by the different chapters to analyze diverse issues such as (i) 
the effects that unilateral environmental actions have on the outcome of lEAs, (ii) the optimal 
number of countries that are needed to make an lEA viable, and (iii) the effect of limited liability 
on the design of lEAs. The six chronologically arranged chapters of Part III apply the economic 
theory of lEAs to practical situations to determine, inter alia, the extent to which this theory can 
inform actual policy decisions about international environmental problems. This part of the book 
focuses on topics such as (i) the determinants of environmental cooperation between Finland and the 
former Soviet Union, (ii) the voluntary provision of a public good in the German state of Saarland, 
and (iii) the role of collective action considerations in reducing sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions 
in Europe. 
2. Theory 
Before one asks and attempts to answer interesting theoretical questions about the 
functioning of lEAs, one must first comprehend the nature of, as it were, the "beast." This is the 
purpose of chapter 2. In this chapter, Scott Barrett provides the reader with a nice guided tour of the 
problem of global environmental protection. He points out that one reason for the lack of simple 
solutions to global international problems is the lack of a World Government that is empowered to 
intervene for the benefit of all citizens. Consequently, Barrett rightly suggests that lEAs provide the 
only reasonable way of solving global environmental problems. Combining the study of the putative 
earns from cooperation with a formal model of an lEA, Barrett points out that relative to the non-
cooperative outcome, the benefits from cooperation are sometimes small. Consequently, even when 
it is needed, cooperation may not be forthcoming. 
J 
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This saturnine conclusion leads to a number of questions. One such question relates to the 
efficacy of unilateral environmental actions. In particular, if the prospects of achieving global 
cooperation are limited, then what, if anything, can one say about instituting environmental policy 
unilaterally?3 This question is addressed lucidly by Michael Hoel in chapter 3. Hoel constructs a two-
country game-theoretic model to study two instances of the institution of unilateral environmental 
policy. In the first instance, a positive and "unselfish" unilateral action is taken by one country in 
the absence of, or prior to, the establishment of an lEA. Hoel shows that in this instance, the pursuit 
of unilateral environmental policy has a salubrious effect on the environment. However, Hoel 
recognizes that an unselfish unilateral action may jeopardize subsequent negotiations on an lEA. 
This is the second instance that he studies. Here, Hoel shows that an unselfish unilateral action may 
compromise negotiations on an lEA and ultimately lead to more pollution emissions than would 
have occurred had both countries acted "selfishly" and not taken unilateral actions. 
Because Hoel's analysis is based largely on a two-country model, it is possible to question 
the generality of his results. For instance, one can ask what happens to his results when the analysis 
involves more than two countries. More generally, one can ask whether a minimum number of 
countries is necessary to successfully negotiate an lEA. This question is addressed ably by Jane 
Black, Maurice Levi, and David de Meza (BLM) in chapter 4. BLM focus on two salient aspects of 
the "minimum numbers" question. First, they demonstrate that if the goal is to effect a viable lEA, 
then it is better to include a "minimum agreement level or n-rule" rather than permit nations to take 
independent actions. This minimum agreement level refers to the minimum number of nations that 
are needed to participate in an lEA before action is taken by anyone participant. Second, BLM point 
3This question has been addressed in the "trade and the environment" literature as well. For more on this, see 
Batabyal (1993, 1994, 1998), and Xu and Batabyal (1999) . 
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out that although signatories to an lEA may have their own country specific n-rules, signatories will 
often lose little by adopting the social welfare maximizing n-rule, instead of their own n-rule. This 
finding has the optimistic implication that countries may in fact be quite willing to put sovereignty 
questions aside and let an international institution set the participation level required to consummate 
an lEA. 
BLM's n-rule can also be thought of as the minimum size of a coalition that is necessary to 
sustain an lEA. This coalition-theoretic view ofIEAs has been adopted by a number of scholars and 
hence there is now a sizeable literature on coalition formation in the context oflEAs.4 In chapter 5, 
Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco present a coalition-theoretic account of lEAs in which the 
signatories to an agreement may choose to act either cooperatively or non-cooperatively. 
Recognizing the difficulty of obtaining universal participation in an lEA, Carraro and Siniscalco 
show that it is possible to design profitable and stable lEAs in which only a coalition or sub-group 
of countries participate. This finding raises a natural question: are there ways of increasing the 
number of signatories to an lEA? Carraro and Sinisca1co point out that the size of the coalition can 
indeed be expanded by using self-financed welfare transfers and by requiring the coalition 
participants to display a minimal level of commitment. By explicitly focusing on the stability of 
lEAs, Carraro and Sinisca1co rightly remind us that in the realm of international environmental 
affairs in which there is no potent "World Government," unstable lEAs are of little or no interest. 
In chapter 6, Scott Barrett provides an alternate perspective on this stability issue. The reader 
will note that a country cannot be forced to join an lEA; moreover, once a country has joined an lEA, 
it can always choose to withdraw from the agreement. Consequently, a useful lEAs must accomplish 
4Por more on this literature, the reader should consult Bohm and Larsen (1993), Kvemdokk (1993), Chander 
and Tulkens (1995, 1996), Welsch (1995), and Pinus and Rundshagen (1998). 
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two things. First, it must appear attractive to potential signatories. Second, once a nation has agreed 
to join an lEA, this nation must want to carry out the terms of the agreement. Owing to these 
reasons, Barrett rightly observes that for an lEA to be utile, it must be self-enforcing. In the rest of 
this chapter, Barrett uses two alternate game-theoretic approaches to analyze the properties of self-
enforcing lEAs. He concludes that a self-enforcing lEA which institutes rules for managing global 
common property resources will typically not be able to improve substantially upon the non-
cooperative outcome. However, it is important to recognize that this potent and negative finding is 
based on an analysis of models in which there are no informational asymmetries of any kind, and 
all countries are identical. Recognizing the restrictiveness of these and other assumptions, Barrett 
wisely calls for additional research to determine the robustness of his findings. 
This call for additional research is taken up by Emmanuel Petrakis and Anastasios 
Xepapadeas in chapter 7. Departing from the analytical approach adopted in chapter 6, these authors 
provide a stimulating, coalition-theoretic account of lEAs in a world in which countries are 
heterogeneous and informational asymmetries between countries are salient. This chapter contains 
two significant findings. First, consistent with the analysis presented in chapter 5, Petrakis and 
Xepapadeas show that if there exists a coalition of environmentally conscious countries that is 
committed to environmental protection, then this coalition can use self-financed transfers or side 
payments fruitfully to attract less environmentally conscious countries into their coalition. Second, 
it is shown that as long as global pollution can be measured accurately and costlessly, a mechanism 
can be constructed, which if incorporated into an lEA between environmentally conscious and less 
environmentally conscious countries, will lead to optimal pollution emissions by all the participating 
countries. 
J 
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Asymmetries between countries comprise the subj ect matter of chapter 8 as well. In this 
chapter, Zhiqi Chen analyzes a well articulated discrete-time, infinite-horizon, model of an lEA in 
the context of the global warming problem. Chen explicitly address the effects that side payments5 
between countries and population size have on the outcome of an IEA. Interestingly, he shows that 
although side payments are a part of the lEA that he analyzes, these side payments do not always 
reflect either the "polluter pays principle" or the "victim pays principle." In particular, parts of these 
side payments arise because of the differential bargaining power of the two nations in his model. 
This leads Chen to note that care must be taken to ensure that the actual outcome of a given 
negotiation process is consistent with a principle such as the "polluter pays principle." As far as 
population size is concerned, this chapter shows that a country with a small population will in 
general gain more from an lEA than will a country with a large population. This enables a small 
country to successfully take a less compromising stand in its negotiations about an lEA with a large 
country. 
Chen's analysis depends on his assumptions that (i) the world consists of only two countries 
and that (ii) governments have complete information about the state of the world's climate and the 
economy. These assumptions are eschewed by Amitrajeet Batabyal in his chapter 9 analysis of the 
design of lEAs. Batabyal studies the problem faced by an imperfectly informed supra-national 
governmental authority (SNGA) with limited monetary resources that wishes to design an IEA for N EN 
developing countries (DCs) . Using a hierarchical principal-agent model, Batabyal investigates the 
properties of the optimal limited liability lEA that can be implemented by the SNGA when polluting 
firms and national governments in the individual DCs collude to the detriment of the SNGA. His 
SThis question has been discussed by a number of scholars. For additional details, see chapters 2, 9, and 11 in 
this book and Maler (1990). 
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analysis shows that obtaining voluntary participation by the firms and the governments and 
preventing ex post breach of the lEA by these two players is costly for the SNGA. Moreover, 
Batabyal 's analysis tells us that because a SNGA can successfully design collusion-proofIEAs, lEAs 
are not inherently doomed due to a basic monitoring and enforcement problem stemming from 
national sovereignty. However, the success of lEAs is fundamentally contingent on the funds 
available for environmental protection. 
Chapters 2 through 9 of this book provide us with diverse theoretical perspectives on the 
economics of lEAs. Collectively, these chapters illustrate the many useful theoretical insights that 
can be gained by engaging in rigorous micro economic and game-theoretic analyses of lEAs. A 
logical question now is this: How can this theoretical knowledge be used to increase our 
understanding of the practical aspects of lEAs? It is to this application issue that we now tum. 
3. Applications 
In chapter 10, Roger Congleton constructs models of democratic and authoritarian 
environmental policy making to explore the effect that political institutions have on the willingness 
of governments to control pollution. Congleton notes that although data and other limitations 
preclude one from testing whether democratic regimes-relative to authoritarian ones-are more 
likely to adopt strict environmental regulations, this hypothesis can be tested using data on lEAs. As 
such, using national area as a proxy for natm"al resources, Congleton analyzes a data set consisting 
of 118 countries. Congleton'S helpful analysis shows that a nation's environmental policy decisions 
are determined primarily by its political institutions, and that as compared to authoritarian nations, 
liberal democracies are considerably more likely to participate in lEAs. 6 These two findings lead 
6This fmding is corroborated by the results contained in chapter 14 and in Olson (1993). 
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Congleton to conclude that lEAs will attract more signatories as the number of democratic regimes 
in the world increases. 
This issue of international participation in an lEA is examined from the perspectives of 
efficiency and equity by lohan Eyckmans, Stef Proost, and Erik Schokkaert (EPS) in chapter II. 
EPS divide the world into twelve homogeneous blocks of countries and then examine the CO2 
emissions reduction strategies employed by each of these twelve players (blocks). In the benchmark 
non-cooperative game in which players behave in Coumot fashion, there is almost no reduction of CO2 
emissions. This pessimistic conclusion changes in the first-best and in the second-best solutions of 
an international carbon emissions game. In particular, while there is virtually no worldwide pollution 
abatement in the benchmark game, there is almost 170/0 pollution abatement in the first-best game. 
The extent of pollution abatement in the second-best game depends on the magnitude of a parameter 
called the degree ofinequality aversion. Interestingly, EPS show that in the context of their modeling 
framework, there is no game outcome in which the net payoffs of all the nations is positive. From 
this, EPS conclude that an analysis of realistic lEAs will need to pay attention to side payments and 
incorporate paliicipation constraints 7 explicitly into the analysis. 
Why are side payments so important? This question is addressed by alIi Tahvonen, Veijo 
Kaitala, and Matti Pohjola (TKP) in their chapter 12 analysis of an acid rain game between Finland 
and the former Soviet Union. TKP focus on the terms of a 1987 lEA between Finland and the Soviet 
Union that called for a 50% reduction in sulfur emissions throughout Finland and in adjacent regions 
of the Soviet Union. TKP calculate the cost-effective and the non-cooperative sulfur abatement 
policies for these two countries and they show that the 1987 lEA is not cost-effective. Moreover, 
7Participation constraints and their salience have been studied in chapter 9 by Arnitrajeet Batabyal. 
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they demonstrate that the abatement costs implied by the agreement are higher than those in the non-
cooperative equilibrium. Interestingly, TKP show that although there are significant potential gains 
from cooperation between these two countries, this cooperation is unlikely to arise because in 
general, cost-effective sulfur lEAs are likely to benefit Finland but not the Soviet Union. This raises 
the thorny issue of side payments once again. As noted by TKP, the implementation of cost-effective 
sulfur lEAs is likely to require side payments from Finland to the Soviet Union. However, from a 
political standpoint, it may not be possible to make such payments. Consequently, other ways of 
implementing cost-effective lEAs will have to be considered. 
In chapter 13, Werner Pommerehne, Lars Feld, and Albert Hart (PFH) study the question of 
international cooperation from a public goods perspective. The issue here is the construction of a 
waste incinerator in Grosbliederstroff (in France) that would have adverse impacts on the residents 
of Kleinblittersdorf (in Germany). On the basis of direct negotiations, it was determined that 
Kleinblittersdorf would buy the land in question from Grosbliederstroff and then look for an investor 
who would be willing to operate a less pollution-intensive incinerator. Bringing this plan to fruition 
required a certain amount of money. PFH analyze the factors that determined the provision of this 
public good, i.e., the construction of an "environmentally more benign" incinerator. On the basis of 
an econometric study of a random sample of 400 households in Kleinblittersdorf, PFH note that non-
economic factors playa crucial role in the voluntary provision of public goods. This leads them to 
conclude that it is important to remember that as compared to economic factors, non-economic 
factors are often a more important determinant of a citizen's voluntary contribution to a particular 
public good. 
Chapter 14 continues the investigation of the voluntary provision of public goods begun in 
the previous chapter. In this chapter, James Murdoch and Todd Sandler provide a thought provoking 
11 
account of cutbacks in CFC emissions that, for the most part, predated the institution of the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Their econometric analysis validates a key 
empirical prediction of the theory of the voluntary provision of public goods. That is, these authors 
demonstrate that when tastes are controlled and three outlier nations are excluded from the sample, 
a statistically significant linear relationship emerges between CFC emission cutbacks and national 
income. On the basis of this demonstration, Murdoch and Sandler claim that the Montreal Protocol 
was initially instituted because it codified reductions in CFC emissions that polluting nations were 
voluntarily prepared to undertake. This leads these authors to conclude that (i) the Montreal Protocol 
may not be a good model for other lEAs, (ii) that foreign aid is likely to quicken the adherence to 
mandated diminutions in CFC emissions, and (iii) that the promotion of democracy is likely to 
increase the number of nations that will take steps to effectively deal with global pollution problems. 
How general are the conclusions of chapter 14? Do they apply to pollutants such as sulfur 
and nitrogen oxides? This and other questions are analyzed by James Murdoch, Todd Sandler, and 
Keith Sargent (MSS) in chapter 15. From their theoretical framework, MSS derive an econometric 
model of the demand for emission reductions which adjusts for the spatial dispersion of the pollutant 
in question. This model enables them to explain why European nations have been able to meet or 
exceed mandated reductions in sulfur emissions, but not mandated reductions in nitrogen oxide 
emissions. MSS point out that sulfur emissions are easier to control than nitrogen oxide emissions 
because, inter alia, a greater proportion of sulfur emissions falls within a country's jurisdiction and 
within an lEA's jurisdiction. Moreover, consistent with the conclusions of chapters 10 and 14, these 
authors point out that because increases in income and political freedoms increase emission 
reductions, foreign aid and the promotion of democracy can result in a cleaner environment for all 
nations. Perhaps the most significant conclusion to emerge from this chapter is that collective action 
J 
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problems that seem superficially similar, can in fact be quite dissimilar. Consequently, one should 
be careful in lumping collective action problems together, even if they involve the same participants. 
4. Conclusions 
The different chapters in this book effectively describe the theoretical and empirical 
contributions that rigorous economic analysis can make in improving our understanding of the 
causes of and the solutions to a variety ofinternational environmental problems. These chapters also 
provide us with a "state of the art" perspective on what is currently known about the theoretical and 
the empirical properties of lEAs. The task for researchers now is to use the findings contained in this 
book to better design and implement actual lEAs. With talk of rising disparity between the 
developed world and the developing world and the increasingly contentious nature of international 
discussions about the use of environmental resources, lEAs take on particular salience. This is in no 
small measure due to the fact that the design and the implementation of lEAs will do more to 
engender and maintain international security than will most unilateral or non-cooperative policy 
measures. 
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